Constitutional lawyer and public affairs analyst, Liborous Oshoma, has faulted the Federal High Court’s decision to set aside its judgment directing the registration of the Nigeria Democratic Congress (NDC), arguing that the Peace Movement Party (PMP), being an unregistered political association, lacks the legal standing to challenge NDC’s registration. Speaking on Nigeria Info FM, Oshoma maintained that the issue of the party’s logo had already been determined in the substantive suit and could not justify reopening a final judgment. David Lawani monitored the interview
The Federal High Court recently revisited its earlier judgment ordering INEC to register the Nigeria Democratic Congress (NDC). Legally, is that permissible? And given the political undercurrents surrounding the issue, especially the perception that every political move involving Peter Obi attracts controversy, what is your assessment?
The court held that the failure to accord the applicant a fair hearing rendered the entire proceedings null and void. Consequently, it ordered that the status quo be restored to its state before the judgment delivered in December 2025, pending the determination of the substantive application.
What exactly does that ruling mean in practical and legal terms?
To properly understand the implications of the ruling, we must first examine the legal basis upon which INEC exercises its powers to register political parties and their logos. It is impossible to discuss the judgment in isolation without considering the facts that gave rise to the dispute. Section 79 of the Electoral Act 2026 provides that the Commission shall maintain a register of names and symbols for political parties participating in elections. It further states that INEC shall register a party’s name and symbol where it is satisfied that no identical or substantially similar name or symbol has already been registered, that the proposed symbol is sufficiently distinctive, and that it is neither offensive nor otherwise objectionable. The same provision also empowers INEC to remove a registered name or symbol where the political party has ceased to exist or has stopped using the registered symbol.
Are you reading from the Constitution?
No. I am reading directly from the provisions of the Electoral Act 2026.
Can you explain how those provisions relate to the present controversy?
Certainly, as a general principle of law, once a court delivers its final judgment, it becomes functus officio. In other words, the judge has exhausted his jurisdiction over that matter and cannot ordinarily alter, vary, amend or set aside that judgment. There are, however, recognised exceptions. A court may revisit its judgment where it lacked jurisdiction to entertain the matter in the first place; where there was no service of court processes leading to a default judgment; where a consent judgment was procured through fraud; where material facts were deliberately suppressed; or where the court itself was improperly constituted. Even where any of these exceptions is alleged, the court must also consider whether the applicant acted diligently upon becoming aware of the facts, whether the delay is excusable, whether setting aside the judgment would prejudice the other party, and whether the applicant’s overall conduct deserves the court’s equitable intervention. Those are not my personal opinions. They are well-established legal principles governing applications to have judgments set aside. Now, let us examine the facts before us. Originating Summons commenced the original action. Lawyers understand what that means. It is a procedure adopted where the dispute revolves primarily around the interpretation of the law rather than contested facts. In this instance, the NDC applied to INEC for registration in 2017. According to the party, INEC rejected its application, prompting it to approach the Federal High Court in Lokoja. INEC opposed the application by filing a counter-affidavit explaining why the registration should not be granted. After considering arguments from both parties, the court delivered its final judgment on December 10, 2025, directing INEC to register the NDC. That is why, if you visit the INEC website today, the registration of the NDC is specifically indicated as having been effected “by court order.” Subsequently, on May 5, 2026, Barrister Emmanuel Uzuru, who described himself as the Protem National Legal Adviser of the Peace Movement Party (PMP), approached the same court on behalf of the proposed political association. He complained that PMP had applied for registration in 2015 and that the NDC’s two-finger logo closely resembled PMP’s proposed logo. He argued that the court ought not to have directed INEC to register the NDC without first hearing PMP, as such registration could prejudice its own pending application. The court entertained those arguments and eventually held that the issue raised by PMP deserved consideration. On that basis, it proceeded to set aside its earlier judgment. That, for me, is where the legal difficulty begins. I deliberately explained the legal principles because the facts of this case do not appear to satisfy the recognised exceptions that would justify setting aside a final judgment.
The issue of the logo appears to be central to this dispute. Had that issue already been considered before the court delivered its December 2025 judgment?
Yes, it had. That is precisely why I believe the court’s latest decision raises legal concerns. If you permit me to refer to the judgment itself, the court expressly stated that the substantive suit was commenced by way of an Originating Summons in which the plaintiff challenged INEC’s refusal to register the Nigerian Democratic Congress as a political party. According to the judgment, the NDC argued that it had complied with all constitutional and statutory requirements under Section 222 of the Constitution. INEC, however, opposed the application and justified its refusal, one of the grounds being the proposed logo and symbol submitted by the NDC as part of its registration documents. In other words, the issue of the logo was never hidden from the court. It formed part of INEC’s defence from the very beginning. The court was fully aware that INEC had relied on the similarity of the logo as one of the reasons for refusing registration before it eventually ordered that the NDC be registered.
So, are you saying INEC specifically informed the court that the logo was one of the reasons it refused to register the NDC?
Exactly. I appreciate that this discussion is technical, but the public needs to understand the legal issues involved. INEC clearly informed the court that one of its reasons for refusing to register the NDC related to the proposed logo. That position appears in the judgment itself. Therefore, for another party to return months later and argue that the court failed to consider the issue of the logo is, in my view, difficult to sustain because that issue had already been canvassed before the court. The court was not confronted with a fresh or previously unknown fact. It had already considered INEC’s position on the logo before directing that the NDC be registered.
When exactly the judgment that has now been set aside was delivered?
The judgment was delivered on December 10, 2025. That date is very significant because it also raises another issue—whether the applicant acted within a reasonable time. From December 10, 2025, to May 5, 2026, when the application was eventually filed, almost five months had elapsed. One of the recognised principles governing applications to set aside judgments is that the applicant must act promptly upon becoming aware of the facts giving rise to his complaint. Equity aids the vigilant, not the indolent. Five months cannot, by any stretch of legal reasoning, be regarded as prompt action. In fact, the applicant himself realised that he had delayed because he first sought an extension of time within which to bring the application. That, in itself, tells you that even he acknowledged he was already outside the permissible period. The question then becomes: if the applicant genuinely believed that the NDC’s logo conflicted with his proposed logo, why wait almost five months before approaching the court?
The applicant argued that he only became aware of the registration much later. Does that explanation satisfy the legal requirements?
Personally, I find that explanation difficult to accept. The court relied on the applicant’s assertion that he only became aware of the registration around April. But let us be realistic. The registration of the NDC through a court order was widely reported across Nigeria. If someone claims to be actively involved in the formation of a political party, can he honestly say he remained unaware of such a significant development from December until April? Even assuming, without conceding, that he only became aware in April, he still did not file immediately. He waited until May before approaching the court. That conduct does not demonstrate diligence. The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasised that an applicant seeking equitable relief must act promptly. Otherwise, the court would be rewarding indolence. What worries me is the implication. If this approach is accepted, it would mean that anyone could come years later, claim that he had only just become aware of a judgment, and ask the same court to reopen a matter that had already been concluded. That would undermine the principle of finality in litigation.
Based on the recognised legal exceptions you earlier outlined, does this particular case satisfy any of them?
In my opinion, it does not. One of the recognised grounds for setting aside a judgment is where material facts were deliberately concealed from the court. That is not what happened here. INEC had already informed the court that it had declined to register the NDC partly because of the logo issue. Therefore, nobody can now argue that the court was misled or that those facts were suppressed. The material facts were already before the court. The judge considered them and still concluded that the NDC should be registered. How then can someone subsequently argue that the court never considered the issue? That does not accord with the record before the court. Even if one accepts that the logos are similar, Section 79 of the Electoral Act already provides a mechanism for addressing such situations. INEC has the statutory authority to require changes to a proposed logo when necessary. Once a political party has been validly registered—particularly pursuant to a court order—it acquires legal precedence over another application that is merely pending. Even if the Peace Movement Party filed its application earlier, the law recognises the party that has already been registered. The practical solution would therefore have been for INEC to invite the unregistered applicant to modify its proposed logo rather than destabilise the legal status of an already registered political party.
The court has now stepped back from its own judgment to entertain this fresh application. In your view, does that decision fall within any of the recognised exceptions that allow a court to revisit its final judgment?
That is exactly the point I have been making. One of the major considerations before a court sets aside its own judgment is whether the applicant acted promptly after becoming aware of the facts giving rise to the complaint. Another is whether there was fraud, suppression of material facts, or any circumstance that prevented the court from considering the real issues. In this case, none of those conditions appears to exist. The information now being relied upon was never concealed from the court. INEC had already placed the issue of the logo before the court in the substantive proceedings. So, it cannot be argued that the judgment was procured through fraud or that there was suppression of material evidence. The relevant facts were available. The court evaluated them and still directed INEC to register the NDC. For that reason, I struggle to see how the court can now say there is a fresh issue requiring it to reopen a matter it had already determined. Another important consideration is prejudice to the successful party. The court ought to ask itself whether setting aside the judgment would unfairly prejudice the respondent—in this case, the NDC. By virtue of that judgment, the party has altered its position. It has admitted members, sold nomination and expression-of-interest forms, mobilised supporters, and participated in INEC’s electoral timetable. Public policy also becomes relevant here. The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasised that courts should be slow to make orders that could cause widespread disruption after parties have acted in reliance on a valid judgment. A useful illustration is the Umaru Yar’Adua v. INEC case. Although the Supreme Court acknowledged certain irregularities in that election, the late Justice Niki Tobi observed that public policy considerations—including the enormous resources already expended and the consequences of upsetting the electoral process—had to be taken into account. Similarly, one would have expected the court in this case to consider the practical consequences of undoing a judgment upon which both INEC and the NDC had already acted. Instead of reopening the matter, the more appropriate course, in my opinion, would have been to advise the dissatisfied party to proceed to the Court of Appeal if it believed the judgment was wrong.
What exactly is the court reopening? Hasn’t the same issue already been ventilated?
Precisely. That is what I find difficult to understand. INEC had already informed the court that one of the reasons it declined to register the NDC was the similarity of its logo to those of existing political parties. The court considered that argument and nevertheless ordered the party’s registration. Now, another applicant comes before the same court, saying, “The logo resembles ours.” What new issue is the court being invited to determine? That issue had already been placed before it. If this approach is permitted, where will litigation end? Tomorrow, another person may come and complain about the party’s name. The following day, someone else may raise another objection. Will the court continue setting aside the same judgment every time a fresh complaint emerges? That is not how our legal system operates. The law recognises the principle of finality in litigation. There must be a point where disputes come to an end. Otherwise, no judgment would ever attain certainty. That is why I believe this decision departs from the settled principles governing applications to set aside final judgments. Indeed, the Supreme Court has consistently held that once a court has finally determined an issue, it cannot reopen or reconsider that issue simply because another party subsequently raises a complaint. The doctrine exists to preserve certainty and stability in the administration of justice.
For the benefit of the public, could you explain what that legal principle means in simple terms?
Certainly, the Supreme Court’s position is that, in determining whether a decision is final, it does not matter whether it was delivered at an interlocutory stage or at the conclusion of the proceedings. What matters is whether the court has finally pronounced on the issue before it. Once it has done so, it cannot ordinarily revisit that issue. Applying that principle here, the issue before the court was whether the NDC satisfied the legal requirements for registration. INEC defended its refusal by pointing to the issue of the logo. The court considered that argument and ordered the registration of the NDC. That issue was therefore concluded. The court cannot now be invited to reconsider the same issue merely because another applicant believes the logo resembles its own. That question had already been answered. The proper forum for challenging the correctness of that judgment is the Court of Appeal—not the same court that delivered it. Interestingly, no appeal was filed against the judgment delivered in December 2025. Instead, the applicants first sought an extension of time before asking the same court to revisit its own judgment. To me, that appears to be an attempt to attack the very foundation upon which the NDC’s registration rests. If the foundation collapses, every subsequent action taken pursuant to that judgment would also be affected. That, in my view, explains the strategy behind the application.
INEC has confirmed that all registered political parties, including the NDC, complied with its May 10 deadline for submission of membership registers. Now that the court has suspended its earlier order, what implications does this have for the electoral process?
The law remains what the courts ultimately declare it to be. The same court that ordered INEC to register the NDC also enabled the party to participate in INEC’s timetable. The NDC complied with the Commission’s directives and submitted all required documents within the stipulated deadline. The immediate consequence of the latest ruling is simply that the party’s name has temporarily disappeared from INEC’s portal pending further judicial determination. That, however, does not erase the fact that the party had already complied with the Commission’s timetable while the earlier judgment remained valid. Another important point is this: the Peace Movement Party itself is not yet a registered political party. So, the question naturally arises: how does an organisation that has not yet attained legal recognition acquire the standing to challenge another party’s registration? Remember that when the NDC initially approached the court, it was also not yet registered. Individuals acting on behalf of the proposed party instituted the action. That is exactly what Barrister Emmanuel Uzuru has done on behalf of the PMP. The difference, however, is that the NDC eventually secured a valid judgment directing INEC to register it, and INEC complied. That legal status cannot simply be ignored because another proposed association subsequently objects. In my opinion, once the Court of Appeal intervenes—assuming it grants a stay or reaches a different conclusion—the legal position will become clearer. Until then, the controversy will continue to generate uncertainty within the electoral process.
With the court suspending its earlier judgment after INEC had confirmed compliance with its timetable, what does this say about Nigeria’s electoral process? Does it represent a setback?
The law remains what the courts ultimately declare it to be. In the same way the court initially compelled INEC to register the NDC, it also has the authority to suspend the legal effect of that registration pending the determination of fresh proceedings. That is the reality of our legal system. What is important, however, is that before this latest development, the NDC had already complied with INEC’s directives. The party met the Commission’s deadline for submitting its membership register and fulfilled all administrative requirements expected of registered political parties. The only obstacle now is that, following the latest order, the NDC’s name is temporarily absent from INEC’s portal pending further judicial determination. The Peace Movement Party (PMP), on the other hand, is still not a registered political party. That raises an important legal question: how can an organisation that has not attained legal status seek to invalidate the registration of another political party already recognised pursuant to a subsisting court order? It is true that when the NDC first approached the court, it was not yet registered either. Individuals acting in a representative capacity instituted the action on behalf of the proposed party. The same approach has now been adopted by Barrister Emmanuel Uzuru, who claims to be acting for the PMP. The distinction, however, is that the NDC has since obtained a valid judgment directing INEC to register it. That judgment changed its legal status. Should the Court of Appeal eventually restore the original judgment or grant a stay of execution against the latest ruling, the NDC will simply continue operating as a registered political party until the substantive issues are finally resolved. From that perspective, I see the present situation as creating uncertainty rather than resolving it.
Some political observers argue that these legal battles are intended to distract and weaken the opposition. Do you share that view?
I expressed a similar opinion the last time we discussed political developments. When you keep an opposition political party permanently occupied with litigation, the effect is not limited to the courtroom. It affects the morale of its supporters and consumes valuable time and resources that ought to be devoted to political organisation. We witnessed something similar during the Ondo State governorship election, which involved the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP). There was prolonged litigation over whether Eyitayo Jegede or Jimoh Ibrahim was the PDP’s valid candidate. That dispute travelled all the way to the Supreme Court and was only resolved barely a week before the election. By then, Rotimi Akeredolu had effectively covered the political field. Many PDP supporters had become uncertain about who their candidate actually was. Some defected to other parties, while others disengaged from the process. That is the practical consequence of prolonged political litigation. When uncertainty persists, supporters begin to lose confidence. Some conclude that their party may not eventually appear on the ballot, while others become politically fatigued. Whether deliberately or not, that uncertainty can weaken the cohesion of an opposition movement. We are already hearing reports of defections from the NDC to the APC, accompanied by narratives portraying the opposition as unstable or lacking direction. Such narratives can influence public perception. If supporters begin to believe that a political platform is collapsing, some may decide to abandon it long before the election itself. In politics, perception is often as important as reality. That is why I believe these legal battles have consequences far beyond the courtroom.
Is politics in Nigeria gradually becoming a battle rather than a democratic contest?
Unfortunately, many supporters do not like hearing this, but Nigerian politics is far more complex than many people imagine. If you intend to build a successful political party, you must build it organically. Politics in Nigeria is not football. It is more like navigating a minefield. Former President Olusegun Obasanjo once described Nigerian politics as a “do-or-die affair.” Whether one agrees with that characterisation or not, politicians approach elections with that mindset. If you are entering that arena, you must prepare accordingly. You need organisational structures at every level, legal teams ready for pre-election and post-election litigation, communication teams, mobilisation structures and people capable of responding to every political challenge that may arise. Some politicians already have their legal teams fully assembled for the 2027 elections. Others have equally strengthened their media operations. Politics is, therefore, much like a game of chess. Every move is carefully calculated. Anyone entering the process with only public sympathy and without institutional preparation may find himself overwhelmed by more organised political actors.
Why do you think INEC has not registered the Peace Movement Party (PMP)?
Several political associations have been deregistered in Nigeria over the years for failing to meet the constitutional requirements set out in Section 225A. After deregistration, some promoters form new associations and begin the registration process anew. The truth is that many political associations exist primarily as platforms awaiting political investors. Some people establish political parties with the hope that influential politicians will eventually adopt or purchase the platform before elections. INEC’s registration requirements, however, are deliberately stringent. Applicants must establish functional structures across the federation, maintain verifiable membership, constitute executive committees at various levels and satisfy several statutory conditions. Many associations fail to meet those standards. Even the NDC eventually secured registration only after obtaining a court order. Interestingly, public awareness of the NDC increased significantly only after it was registered and prominent political figures, including Peter Obi, identified with the platform. That naturally attracted supporters. Others remained in different political parties. That is simply the nature of democratic politics. Returning to the legal issue, however, my position remains unchanged. The question of the logo had already been considered before the court delivered its judgment. Reopening the same issue through another application does not, in my respectful opinion, accord with settled legal principles. Even if the two logos are substantially similar, there remains a straightforward administrative solution. INEC can require the unregistered association to modify its proposed logo. That approach preserves the integrity of the court’s judgment while addressing concerns about the similarity of the symbols. It is certainly preferable to unsettle the legal status of a political party that has already been registered pursuant to a valid court order.
What, in your view, would have been the most practical way of resolving this dispute?
The practical solution appears fairly straightforward. The NDC has already been registered and has complied with INEC’s timetable. If another proposed political association presents a logo that substantially resembles the NDC’s, INEC should require that association to adopt a different logo. That happens regularly in regulatory practice. The objective should be to preserve certainty while ensuring that no two political parties operate with confusingly similar symbols. That approach would have resolved the dispute without disrupting the electoral process or reopening litigation that had already been concluded.
Finally, how can Nigeria reduce its persistent dependence on the courts to resolve political disputes?
