By Rekpene Bassey
Plateau State’s latest security controversy raises a question that extends beyond Jos and its troubled rural communities: can a state sustain an effective campaign against armed violence when allegations against security agencies become entangled with ethnic rivalry, political pressure and competing narratives of victimhood?
The October 21, 2026, press conference by a coalition of indigenous youth organisations, defending the Department of State Services (DSS), the Mobile Police Force and Operation Rainbow, has brought that question into sharp focus.
The immediate dispute follows a petition dated October 5, reportedly submitted by Plateau chapters of the Miyetti Allah Cattle Breeders Association of Nigeria (MACBAN), the Gan Allah Fulani Development Association of Nigeria (GAFDAN), the Fulbe Youth Development Association (FUYODA) and other groups.
The petition allegedly accused security operatives, particularly the DSS, of discriminatory conduct and responsibility for killings, abductions, cattle rustling and the poisoning or shooting of cattle.
The indigenous youth coalition has rejected these allegations, arguing that they threaten to undermine operations against armed groups. These are competing claims, not established findings; the distinction is fundamental to any serious security assessment.
The first lesson from intelligence practice is that an allegation is a lead, not a conclusion. A petition may contain reliable evidence, politically motivated accusations, genuine grievances or a mixture of all three. The identity of its authors neither proves nor invalidates its contents.
Equally, the fact that an accusation could embarrass an agency does not make it false. Professional intelligence analysis requires investigators to separate what is known, what is alleged, what is inferred and what remains unverified. To abandon that discipline is to replace intelligence with advocacy.
However, the timing and potential consequences of the controversy deserve scrutiny. The coalition argues that the petition and a circulating social media video could weaken joint security operations, discredit the Plateau State Director of Security (SDS), Paul Damian, and create pressure for changes in operational leadership. It also questions a narrative that reportedly portrays the Nigerian Army as the only security institution acting in the interest of peace.
Whether the alleged campaign was deliberately coordinated to achieve these objectives remains unproven. Nevertheless, the possibility that public narratives could influence operational decisions deserves attention from those responsible for national security.
In intelligence, motive is a hypothesis to be tested, not a substitute for evidence. Analysts examine who benefits from an outcome, but they do not confuse potential advantage with proof of conspiracy.
An armed group might benefit from the withdrawal of pressure on its networks; a political actor might benefit from a change of command; a community might seek protection against genuine abuses.
These possibilities can coexist. The appropriate response is to investigate the evidence, establish the actors and their interests, and resist the temptation to assign a single motive to every participant.
Plateau’s security crisis, meanwhile, is considerably larger than the present dispute. Repeated attacks, killings, displacement, destruction of farms and the erosion of confidence between communities have created a landscape in which rumours can acquire the force of apparent facts.
A special report by Premium Times, published on August 22, 2026, examined how misinformation and inflammatory social media narratives contributed to the escalation of reprisal violence in Plateau between February and April.
The report illustrates a central danger: when the identity of attackers is assumed before it is established, online speculation can rapidly become a justification for real-world retaliation.
The intelligence implications are profound. Information warfare does not always require sophisticated technology, fabricated documents or an elaborate foreign operation. Sometimes it consists of an old video presented as new, a genuine incident stripped of context, a casualty figure repeated without verification, or an accusation framed to make an entire community appear culpable.
Repetition creates familiarity; familiarity can be mistaken for truth. In a conflict environment, such distortions may inflame fear, encourage reprisals, compromise sources and divert security resources from imminent threats. The decisive question is not simply whether information is circulating, but whether it is authentic, contextualised and independently corroborated.
The coalition has cited specific incidents to support its defence of the security agencies. These include an alleged attack on a DSS base at Nding Sesut in Barkin Ladi Local Government Area on June 1; the reported killing of two DSS officers during an attack on Tanjol and Tarai villages on August 23; and the deaths of Mobile Police personnel and Operation Rainbow officer DSP David Babale in separate incidents. It also refers to injuries sustained by DSS personnel responding to distress calls in Mangu.
These claims are serious and warrant verification through operational records, casualty reports, official statements and independent accounts. They should not be presented as independently established facts merely because they appear in a public statement.
If substantiated, such attacks would underscore a reality that is sometimes lost in public debate: security personnel are also victims of the violence they are deployed to contain. Their deaths deserve investigation, their families deserve support, and their colleagues deserve the institutional backing necessary to carry out lawful duties.
But the loss of officers cannot automatically establish the innocence of an agency in every other allegation made against it. Nor does a claim of misconduct invalidate the sacrifices of its personnel. A sound security system must be capable of recognising both operational courage and the possibility of institutional failure.
The coalition also credits joint operations with arrests, including that of a man it identifies as Ardo Mahmoud Adams, whom it describes as an alleged leader of armed groups, alongside reductions in mass attacks and crop destruction.
Those claims should be assessed against arrest records, prosecutorial outcomes, independently verified incident data and evidence of improved civilian safety.
An arrest is an operational output; it is not, by itself, proof that a security campaign is succeeding. The strategic test is whether violence declines sustainably, displaced people can return safely, farms can be cultivated, and communities can resume normal economic life without fear of renewed attack.
Here lies one of the most important distinctions in security intelligence: tactical success is not necessarily strategic success. Capturing a suspected commander, recovering weapons or disrupting a supply network may weaken a criminal organisation. But if attacks recur, informants remain vulnerable, communities distrust security personnel and armed actors retain the capacity to recruit, the wider mission remains incomplete.
Intelligence-led operations must therefore be evaluated through a continuing cycle of collection, analysis, action and reassessment. The objective is not merely to produce arrests or demonstrate force; it is to reduce the adversary’s ability to inflict harm.
The allegation that some personnel may be colluding with armed groups also requires an impartial investigation. The coalition itself has called for scrutiny of alleged compromise and complacency within elements of the Nigerian Army.
Such accusations should neither be suppressed because they concern a respected institution nor accepted because they fit a community’s suspicions. Investigators should examine operational logs, deployment patterns, communications, weapons records, witness testimony and any other lawfully obtained evidence relevant to specific incidents.
Where wrongdoing is established, the response must be disciplinary or criminal, as appropriate. Institutional loyalty cannot justify impunity, and public suspicion cannot substitute for proof.
The same standard applies to allegations against the DSS, Mobile Police and Operation Rainbow. Claims of cattle poisoning, unlawful seizure, killings or discriminatory treatment must be investigated incident by incident.
Where cattle are found on farms, the relevant questions include who owns them, whether trespass occurred, what damage was documented, whether force was used and whether the animals were handled in accordance with the law.
Where an abduction or killing is alleged, investigators must establish the identities of the victims, the sequence of events, the available physical evidence and the possible perpetrators. A credible investigation must be capable of exonerating the innocent as well as establishing responsibility.
There is also a constitutional principle at stake. Every Nigerian, irrespective of ethnicity, religion, occupation or place of residence, is entitled to equal protection under the law. The state must protect farming communities from armed attacks and unlawful displacement; it must also protect innocent herders from discrimination, unlawful detention, extortion and collective punishment.
Criminal responsibility is individual, not hereditary or ethnic. A Fulani citizen is not a militant by identity, just as an indigenous Plateau resident is not responsible for every act committed by someone claiming to defend that resident’s community. Security language that erases this distinction risks turning the fight against armed criminality into a wider struggle over belonging.
The coalition’s description of anyone seeking the withdrawal of security operations as an “enemy of the state” is therefore a dangerous overreach. Citizens and organisations retain the right to petition public authorities, challenge alleged abuses and seek judicial remedies. That right does not confer immunity for deliberate falsehoods, intimidation or the obstruction of lawful operations, if such conduct is established.
But disagreement with a security agency is not itself evidence of support for terrorism. Democratic authority is strengthened when complaints are investigated transparently, not when complainants are presumed disloyal. The proper dividing line is between lawful advocacy and demonstrable criminal conduct.
Nor should the Nigerian Army, the DSS, the police and official security structures be drawn into a competition for public approval. Their mandates differ, but their effectiveness depends on coordination.
The DSS has responsibilities relating to domestic intelligence and internal security; the police carry core law-enforcement responsibilities; the armed forces have distinct military duties; and state-supported structures must operate within their lawful authority.
The Federal Government’s April 2026 initiative to review the proliferation and coordination of security and paramilitary agencies acknowledged concerns about overlapping responsibilities and operational inefficiencies.
Plateau’s experience reinforces the need for clear command relationships, defined responsibilities, timely intelligence sharing and mechanisms for resolving inter-agency disputes.
It is noteworthy here that intelligence not shared with the appropriate operational partner may be intelligence wasted. Still, sharing must be disciplined: information needs to reach those who can act on it, while sensitive sources, methods and personal data must be protected.
Agencies should maintain agreed protocols for threat assessments, incident reporting, joint briefings and deconfliction of operations. A common operating picture would help distinguish verified incidents from rumours, identify emerging patterns and prevent conflicting accounts from undermining public confidence.
Coordination is not achieved merely because officers wear different uniforms at the same location; it is achieved when their decisions reinforce a common, lawful objective.
The reported claim that ₦20 million was being raised to finance a campaign of media attacks and litigation is another matter that demands evidentiary restraint. The coalition has alleged that funds were being mobilised for this purpose, including activity involving media platforms. Unless supported by financial records, credible testimony or other verifiable material, the allegation must remain an allegation.
Litigation and media engagement are not inherently suspicious activities; both are legitimate features of public life. If there is evidence of unlawful financing, deliberate fabrication or a coordinated effort to obstruct justice, the appropriate authorities should investigate the conduct and its organisers rather than rely on insinuation.
The question of the SDS’s position should be approached with similar discipline. Security leadership changes can disrupt relationships with informants, interrupt institutional continuity and create uncertainty during sensitive operations.
Arbitrary redeployment in response to untested allegations would therefore carry risks. But a public campaign to retain a particular officer cannot become a substitute for normal administrative oversight.
The proper decision should rest on professional performance, operational requirements, integrity assessments and the needs of the service. Personnel decisions should be neither rewards for political support nor punishments for public criticism.
What, then, should the Federal Government do? First, establish a credible, independent process to examine the competing allegations, with access to relevant records and the capacity to interview complainants, security personnel and affected residents.
Second, require the relevant agencies to document the incidents cited by the coalition and publish findings that can safely be disclosed without compromising active operations or witnesses.
Third, strengthen coordinated intelligence assessment and civilian-protection procedures across the DSS, police, military, Operation Rainbow and lawful community security structures.
Fourth, create a transparent channel through which communities can report abuses, threats and emerging attacks without fear of retaliation. Each measure should have clear responsibilities, deadlines and measurable outcomes.
Ultimately, Plateau’s security crisis cannot be resolved by deciding which ethnic coalition deserves to be believed, which agency deserves unquestioning praise, or which petition should be dismissed before its evidence is examined.
It requires a system that can distinguish intelligence from rumour, criminal networks from innocent communities, operational success from public relations and legitimate criticism from demonstrable sabotage.
The most effective security institutions are not those that demand immunity from scrutiny, but those whose professionalism survives it. Plateau’s people need protection, its security personnel need effective support, and every credible allegation needs a fair hearing.
The governing principle must be uncompromising: protect the innocent, investigate the evidence, hold offenders accountable and never allow ethnic narratives to become a substitute for intelligence.
Rekpene Bassey is a Security Specialist and President of the African Council on Narcotics (ACON).
