Bane of our security strategy

By Rekpene Bassey

The Katsina State Government’s recent announcement of a 30-day sustained military operation against bandits is undoubtedly a bold statement of intent. Dr Nasir Mu’azu, the Commissioner for Security and Home Affairs, articulated this decision to leverage the state’s security apparatus to counter the alarming rise in banditry that has terrorized communities across the state.

Following an extended State Security Council meeting, Governor Dikko Radda endorsed this plan, activating a comprehensive four-tier security structure to ensure coverage across all Local Government Areas (LGAs).

While the government’s commitment to restoring peace and security is commendable, publicly declaring such an operation before its execution raises several significant concerns that could undermine its success.

The fundamental question is at the core of these concerns: Why was this operation publicized before its commencement? In military and security operations, the element of surprise is not just a tactical advantage—it is often the linchpin of a successful operation.

By announcing the operation in advance, the Katsina State Government inadvertently compromised its efforts, providing bandits with a critical window of opportunity to evade capture, re-strategize, or relocate.

This decision, while perhaps intended as a demonstration of transparency or resolve, exposes a critical flaw in the security strategy—a flaw that could have dire and far-reaching consequences.

Publicizing an operation of this magnitude before its execution could be interpreted in several ways: as a sign of professional naivety, an act of political grandstanding, or even an ill-advised attempt to reassure the public. However, in a region like Katsina, where insecurity has reached alarming levels, the primary focus should be results rather than rhetoric.

The state has suffered immensely at the hands of bandits, with 19 out of its 34 LGAs reportedly under siege. This statistic alone underscores the severity of the situation and the urgent need for a more sophisticated and discreet approach to security operations. The gravity of the situation demands a calculated and covert strategy designed to outmanoeuvre criminal elements rather than inadvertently assist them.

The decision to publicize this operation also calls into question the role and influence of security experts within the state’s decision-making process. Were there no advisors to counsel against such a move? The involvement of seasoned security professionals in planning and executing such operations is crucial, particularly in a state like Katsina, which has been at the epicenter of banditry and insurgency.

The fact that Katsina is the home state of the immediate past President of Nigeria, Muhammadu Buhari, further complicates the situation. One would expect that the state’s security apparatus would be more robust and effective, capable of safeguarding its citizens even in the face of such severe challenges well before now. This demonstrates how laissez-faire the former President was.

The public declaration of this operation not only jeopardizes its success but also reflects poorly on the strategic thinking and coordination within the state’s security architecture.

Governor Radda’s determination to combat banditry is commendable, but the chosen approach may prove counterproductive. Effective security strategies must be grounded in intelligence, secrecy, and precision. A well-coordinated, top-secret sting operation, informed by actionable intelligence from human sources and technological surveillance, would likely achieve far greater success than a widely publicized operation.

The essence of any successful security operation lies in its ability to catch the adversary off guard—which is nearly impossible when the adversary is forewarned. In this context, the government’s strategy seems more likely to temporarily chase bandits away rather than permanently eliminate the threat they pose.

The consequences of this premature announcement are predictable and deeply concerning. Bandits in Katsina will likely disperse to other regions, biding their time until the operation ends, only to return and resume their activities once the security forces withdraw.

This pattern has been observed in other parts of the country, where similar publicized operations have led to temporary lulls in criminal activity, followed by resurgences once the security presence diminishes. This cyclical pattern of violence undermines the effectiveness of security operations and erodes public trust in the government’s ability to protect its citizens.

To break this cycle, a more nuanced and less conspicuous approach is required—one that involves federal support, cross-border intelligence sharing, and sustained pressure on the bandits. The federal government’s involvement is crucial in supplementing the efforts of state governments like Katsina.

A coordinated national strategy is essential to tackle banditry comprehensively and consistently across all affected regions. This strategy should encompass not only military operations but also broader efforts to address the root causes of banditry, such as poverty, unemployment, and the proliferation of small arms. No matter how well-intentioned, any military operation is unlikely to yield long-term results without addressing these underlying issues.

Furthermore, the importance of engaging local communities in the fight against banditry cannot be overstated. These communities are often the first to bear the brunt of insecurity, and their cooperation is vital for the success of any security operation.

The government can create a more robust and effective security network by involving local leaders, vigilante groups, and community members in intelligence gathering and surveillance. Combined with the element of surprise, this grassroots approach would significantly enhance the chances of success in operations against bandits.

Community engagement fosters trust between the government and the populace and ensures that security operations are more informed and targeted.

While the Katsina State Government’s resolve to tackle banditry is a positive development, publicizing such operations before they are executed is deeply flawed. Security operations require a blend of discretion, intelligence, and surprise to be effective.

The current approach risks the success of the operation and the safety of the citizens it aims to protect. Moving forward, it is imperative that both state and federal authorities adopt a more strategic and holistic approach to security—one that prioritizes results over rhetoric and ensures that criminal elements are consistently outmanoeuvred.

The battle against banditry in Katsina, and indeed across Nigeria, can only be won with a strategy as sophisticated and dynamic as the threat itself. This strategy must be adaptive, responsive to bandits’ evolving tactics, and grounded in the realities on the ground.

It must also be supported by a robust framework of intelligence sharing, both within Nigeria and with neighbouring countries, to ensure that bandits cannot simply slip across borders to evade capture. Only through such a comprehensive and integrated approach can the scourge of banditry be effectively countered, bringing lasting peace and security to the people of Katsina and beyond.

*Rekpene Bassey is the President of the African Council on Narcotics (ACON). He is also a Security and Drug Prevention Expert.