By Lemmy Ughegbe, Ph.D
For decades, the debate over state police in Nigeria has oscillated between necessity and apprehension.
Supporters argue that a country as vast and diverse as ours can no longer depend solely on a centrally controlled police system to tackle the growing menace of banditry, kidnapping, communal violence, and other forms of insecurity.
Opponents, however, warn that governors may convert state police into instruments of political persecution and intimidation.
With the House of Representatives having passed the bill to establish state police and the Senate expected to consider concurrence, the conversation should no longer be about whether Nigeria needs state police.
The more urgent question now is this: who will police the state police?
The fears are not imaginary. Nigeria’s political culture offers sufficient reasons for concern. In a system where incumbents already wield enormous influence, many fear that state police could become an extension of governors’ political machinery, deployed against opponents, dissenters, journalists, and even members of their own parties.
Yet the possibility of abuse should not become an argument against reform. Virtually every democratic institution is susceptible to misuse. The answer lies not in abandoning the idea, but in constructing constitutional safeguards strong enough to prevent abuse.
Indeed, several federal systems around the world have successfully operated multiple layers of policing.
The United States maintains municipal police departments, state police forces and federal agencies such as the FBI. Canada combines provincial police services with the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. Germany’s sixteen states maintain their own police structures alongside federal law enforcement institutions. India equally operates state police while preserving federal investigative and security agencies.
The lesson from these jurisdictions is that decentralised policing works best when accompanied by strong checks and balances.
Perhaps the most critical safeguard Nigeria must consider concerns Section 308 of the Constitution, which grants immunity to governors from civil and criminal proceedings while in office. That immunity was intended to protect the office from frivolous distractions, not to create a sanctuary for criminal conduct.
Therefore, if a governor uses state police to facilitate unlawful detention, torture, politically motivated arrests, election intimidation, enforced disappearances or extrajudicial killings, such conduct should automatically constitute an exception to constitutional immunity. In such circumstances, federal authorities should immediately assume jurisdiction.
No governor should be allowed to command armed officers to violate citizens’ rights and then hide behind Section 308 for four years. Immunity should protect governance, not criminality.
Another vital safeguard lies in ensuring that State Commissioners of Police enjoy security of tenure. If governors possess unrestricted powers to appoint and dismiss police chiefs, state police commissioners may become political aides in uniform.
Appointments should involve State Police Service Commissions, legislative confirmation and the participation of the National Police Council. Removal should equally be subjected to constitutional procedures rather than the whims of governors. Professional independence is indispensable if policing is to retain public trust.
Similarly, recruitment, promotion and discipline should not be placed solely under the control of state executives. Independent State Police Service Commissions comprising retired judges, representatives of the Nigerian Bar Association, civil society groups, women organisations, labour unions, traditional institutions and security experts would help insulate the institution from political capture.
Nigeria should also preserve concurrent jurisdiction between state and federal law enforcement agencies. Matters involving terrorism, organised crime, electoral violence, human rights abuses and corruption involving governors themselves should remain within the competence of federal agencies. A governor must never become both the accused and the controller of the investigators.
Independent citizens’ complaints commissions should equally be established in every state to receive and investigate allegations of abuse, extortion, torture and unlawful detention. Their findings should be enforceable and subject to judicial review.
Special caution is necessary during elections. State police should not be deployed for electoral purposes solely at governors’ discretion.
Such deployments ought to involve the Independent National Electoral Commission, federal law enforcement agencies and, where necessary, judicial oversight. Elections must remain contests of ideas, not contests of coercion.
Perhaps even more importantly, the Constitution should create severe consequences for governors who weaponise state police. Abuse of state police powers should trigger the immediate suspension of immunity, a criminal investigation, impeachment proceedings, and disqualification from future public office. Democracy cannot afford to create elected emperors with armed wings.
Ironically, many of those who oppose state police today do so because they fear abuse by governors. Yet abuse itself is not peculiar to decentralised systems.
Nigerians have witnessed allegations of misuse even under the current centralised arrangement. Centralisation has not insulated the country from insecurity, nor has it eliminated political interference.
The challenge before lawmakers, therefore, is not whether to establish state police, but whether they possess the wisdom and courage to build sufficient constitutional guardrails around them.
Nigeria requires a policing architecture that is closer to the people, more responsive to local realities and more effective against contemporary security threats. But such a structure must be founded on accountability, professionalism and constitutional restraint.
The answer to the fear of abuse is not the rejection of state police. It is the creation of institutions strong enough to ensure that no governor, no matter how powerful, becomes the owner of a private army funded by the public.
As the Senate considers this historic legislation, lawmakers must remember that history will judge them not merely by whether they created state police, but by whether they succeeded in ensuring that state police serve the people rather than those who temporarily occupy power.
Because in the final analysis, the most important question remains the simplest. Who polices the state police?
Dr Lemmy Ughegbe, FIMC, CMC
Email: lemmyughegbeofficial@gmail.com
